








WHY DOES EARTH MOVE TO THE CENTRE?







Why, and how, does earth move to the centre of Aristotle’s universe—the Totality, as he calls it? In a famous passage in Physics 4.1, Aristotle says: “The movements of the simple natural bodies, like fire and earth and their like, not only shows that place is something, but also that it has some power. For, if it is not impeded, each body moves to its own place, one above and the other below” (208b8–12). The thesis is that something about the movement of earth and fire to their proper places shows that place has power, and exists. 
In an important article, Peter Machamer (1978) argued that Aristotle’s statement had almost uniformly been misconstrued as implying that “there is some sort of attractive power of the place on the moving element” (377). This cannot be correct, Machamer points out, for a little more than half a page on, in the same chapter, Aristotle says:
Of what could one make place a cause? None of the four causes is present in it: it is not a material cause of existent things, for nothing is made of it; nor is it a form and definition of things; it is not an end; it does not change existent things. (Phys 4.1, 209a 19–22)
If a place affected a moving body either in the way that the military leader exerts an attraction on his followers, i.e., by conducting himself in a way that they wish to emulate (cf. Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a11–24), or in the way that a gravitating mass does in Newton’s theory, then clearly it would be a final or efficient cause. Aristotle’s statement above implies that place is not like this. 
How could it be? For Aristotle, a thing’s place is “the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it” (Phys 4.4, 212b20–21). Places are defined relative to things in his system. This leads to two problems of interpretation as far as our present passage is concerned. Firstly, what is the thing that contains the proper place of earth and of fire? Secondly, how does the boundary of this thing act on earth or fire? To our way of thinking today, a two-dimensional surface cannot exert an influence all by itself—it has no mass and no other power by which to exert an influence. Only the thing to which this surface belongs can act on something else. Does Aristotle have a different view?​[1]​ And if so, is it coherent? Machamer says: “What is needed is an account of the power of natural place which is somehow not causal” (378). This may be right in some sense, but it leaves us with the problem of what Aristotle means when he says that place has some power. One might add that we need also to validate Aristotle’s inference that place exists. 




To a mechanist, movement is a fundamental and unified kind of quantifiable change. In the differential calculus, the foundational mathematical treatment of change in classical mechanics, movement is defined as the first derivative of position with respect to time. On this way of thinking, circular motion belongs to the same broad category as linear change. To an extent, this is true for Aristotle as well (cf. De caelo 1.2, 269a2–4). But for him this category cross-cuts with another distinction that is vital for our purposes. From the point of view of this other distinction, circular and linear motion are fundamentally different from one another, and each is grouped with other kinds of change. 
	The heavenly body rotates; fire and earth move in straight lines upwards and downwards. In our mechanistic understanding, both move, though on different kinds of paths. For Aristotle, however, there is a major difference between these movements. Circular motion of an extended body in place is not a change of place (De caelo 1.9, 278b30), for the “innermost motionless boundary of what contains” a rotating thing—its place—does not change; moreover, when that thing is spherical, it is always contiguous with that boundary. An important consequence of this is that circular motion is not motion to a place. As we shall see in a moment, something that moves to a place stops moving when it gets there. The heavenly body never stops; its activity is temporally homogeneous—at any given moment, it is in the same state as at any other moment.​[2]​ In this respect, circular motion is not a process by which the potentiality to be somewhere is actualized. Rather, it is an actuality (energeia). It imitates God’s actuality, as does also the contemplative or theorizing activity of the human intellect, which, for us, is the highest good. Circular motion belongs, therefore, to a class of homogeneous activities that encompasses other things than motion.
The linear motion of earth and fire are, by contrast with actualities, end-oriented. In Aristotle’s scheme, end-oriented change (or e-change) has a terminus.​[3]​ For Aristotle, e-change is a passage from the lack of some quality F to the possession of that quality F. Consider natural change. A thing x that is naturally F, but not actually F (because it is impeded from becoming F or because it is immature and still progressing toward F), will possess a potentiality to achieve its natural state, F. (The terms “potentiality,” “power,” and “tendency” will be used interchangeably here.) 
Let Po(F) be x’s potentiality to achieve the static condition, F. In virtue of Po(F), x will also possess a further potentiality Po(towards F) to undergo a certain process: for in order to achieve the static F-state it must first leave its non-F state and traverse the points that are qualitatively or quantitatively intermediate between this non-F state and the F-state that is natural to it. Po(towards F) is the dynamic potentiality for change or process. When x gets to, or becomes, F, it ceases to be in process; its impetus to change is exhausted. Something that is F no longer has the potentiality to undergo the process of achieving F, except insofar as it has a potentiality to be displaced from the F-condition. 
It is the distinction between Po(F) and Po(towards F) that Aristotle has in mind when he says that “alteration is the actuality of the alterable qua alterable” (Phy 3.3, 202b25–26). Since the actuality of x qua Po(F) is the static condition F, change (or alteration) must be defined as the actuality of x qua tendencies like Po(towards F). The latter is actualized when impediments to change are removed, or when x comes into contact with something that imparts to it an impetus toward F. Po(F) is actualized when something gets to F and is no longer changing. The potentiality for process toward F is causally subordinate to, and properly understood in terms of, the first potentiality, viz., the tendency to be in the F-state, where F is the end-point of change.

E-change and the Movement of Earth

Aristotle’s framework for understanding the natural motion of earth is best understood within this schema for e-change.  Consider first the terminus.  He identifies earth (the element) as 
(A) that which is at rest at the centre of the Totality.​[4]​  
This is the being or form of earth—it is what makes earth what it is. When they get to their natural places, the sublunary elements actualize their form. “To be in a certain place, i.e., up, is the actuality (energeia) of the light” (Physics 8.4, 255b11); earth for its part actualizes its form by being at the centre. To be in a certain place is, or at least is some part of, what it is to be earth.  (It is also part of the form of earth that it is cold and dry—De gen et corr. 2.3, 330b5.) 
And now the associated e-change:
(B) Earth moves toward the centre if it is not impeded. 
The natural motion of earth follows from (A), i.e., it is a consequence of the form of earth, but not part of this essence.​[5]​ The form of earth is static; its natural motion is a realization of this static essence. 
Earth is heavy, Aristotle keeps saying. What does this mean? Aristotle consistently defines the heavy in terms of natural motion to the centre (De caelo 1.3, 269b23; 4.1, 307b32; cf. Gill, this volume). This means that earth is heavy in virtue of (B), not (A), and that heaviness is not its form, but rather the innate source of movement that follows from its essence by the Po(F)/Po(towards F) inference explained in section II.  Sheldon Cohen (1994) captures the thought well: “The change that restores it to its natural condition of stasis is natural in following from an intrinsic principle of rest” (156-157). 
A clod of earth that is displaced from the centre possesses a natural potentiality Po(at the centre), which is actualized when it is stationary at the centre. This corresponds to (A) above, the form of earth. But this stationary condition can be actualized only if it participates in a certain process; it must leave its non-central position and traverse the points that lie between this initial position and the centre. Thus, it will possess a natural tendency, Po(towards the centre), to actualize its form by moving to the centre. This corresponds to (B). It is particularly important to note that this power of motion, Po(towards the centre), is activated only when an element is not in its natural place. When it occupies that place, its nature is to stay there: for as Aristotle emphasizes in Physics II 1, nature is a cause both of movement and of rest. Heaviness is part of earth’s nature—and a thing’s nature is its source of motion. It is important here not to conflate nature and form or being.​[6]​ 
This is the point made in De caelo 4.3: “The account of a thing being borne to its proper place is similar to that of other comings-to-be and changes” (310a20–22). “Each thing borne to its own place is borne to its own form” (310a34–b1). And later:
When air comes to be from water, that is, light from heavy, it moves toward the upper place. The moment it is light, it is no longer becoming light, but is in that place. It is evident, then, that it moves while it is potential and progressing toward its actuality there, and toward the quantity and quality proper to its actual state. It is by the same cause that what already is and exists as earth and fire moves towards its own place, unless something prevents it. (De caelo 4.3, 311a1–7) 
The idea expressed in the third sentence of this passage (italicized above) is complicated by the fact that Aristotle is thinking of evaporation—water actually changing into air as it moves upward. Thus, part of his point is that water is potentially air, and potentially possesses air’s natural capacity to rest in an upper place. This would be to attribute an iterated potentiality to water—a potentiality to acquire a potentiality. However that might be, he is clearly saying that air’s potentiality is actualized when it achieves its proper place, whether that state is being in a particular place (as in the case of an element displaced from its natural place), or having a certain quantity or quality (as in the case of water that is in the process of being transformed into air). 

Doubts about the Dynamic Interpretation

Suppose for a moment that the static interpretation proposed in the previous section—the idea that the form of earth is its static condition at the centre—is mistaken. Suppose that, as many commentators have contended (recently Benjamin Morison (2002) 51–53, and now Gill in this volume), earth is defined by the dynamic principle of movement toward the centre, not by the static principle of rest there. How then would we explain the immobility of earth at the centre? Mary Louise Gill asserts (this volume, notes 7 and 10) that earth is held in place at the centre by the many bits of earth vying for that place. It is at rest “not because it is programmed to stop, but because its downward progress is impeded by clods of earth approaching from other directions or by the large ball of earth already there.” The problem with this, as I see things, is that it is not clear why a clod of earth held in place would be in natural rather than imposed rest. Like a car on the Don Valley Parkway—apologies for a Toronto joke—earth is immobile because other things crowd in, not on account of an innate principle. 
The case of fire is slightly different. Gill (1991, 261) is right to say: “Fire is not programmed to stop at the periphery—it would proceed upward indefinitely if it were not confined by the sphere of the moon” (my emphasis). Here, the periphery she is talking about is that of the sublunary sphere. Fire is supposed to go to the periphery of the universe, but since the heavenly element occupies that spot, fire is prevented from going all the way out. Still: this does not argue in favour of a dynamic interpretation of the elementary essences. In her contribution to this volume, Gill acknowledges (note 10) that fire would naturally rest at the outer extremity, if only it could get there. This surely requires a static interpretation. 
There is an interesting complication here because Aristotle says, “the heavy and the light are said both simply and relative to something else” (De caelo 4.1, 308a7–8). I take his theory of relative heaviness and lightness in the following way: While each of the upwardly moving elements (fire and air) rests at the periphery, and each of downwardly moving elements (water and earth) rests at the centre, fire and earth have a stronger impetus toward these places than their pair-mates.​[7]​ Thus if earth were to be removed, water would go to the centre, but otherwise its path to the centre is cut off, and it forms a shell around earth. Thus, I do not see a need to distinguish between the natural resting place of water and that of earth. 
This pairing of sublunary elements makes sense of the treatment of Book 1, where the basis for distinguishing water from earth and fire from air is skated over—the claim in 1.2 is that there are just three kinds of simple movement for the elements: away from the centre, towards the centre, and around the centre (268b23–24). In my view, Aristotle’s main motivation for positing four sublunary elements instead of two comes not from considerations of natural place and natural movement, but from the qualitative considerations—four elements are needed to accommodate all compatible pairings of hot-cold and dry-wet (De gen. et corr. 2.2). The relative heaviness/lightness view is needed in order to bring the centre/periphery view of Book 1 into line with the tangible qualities view just mentioned. And it is a bonus that this version of the four-element theory explains the oceans being on top of earth. (On the other hand, fire is not observed in the upper region, but seems rather to be inferred—see Meteorology 1.3.) 
Now, it is true that the “static reading” of elementary essences runs into patchy waters later in the De caelo. For at De caelo 4.5, 312b3–20, Aristotle seems to suggest (a) that the proper place of water is removed from that of earth, and (b) that it would nevertheless occupy the centre if all earth were to be removed. If this were right, descending water would rush on past its natural place to occupy the natural place of earth when earth is removed. Indeed, it would not stop even there if it were not for the fact that it would collide with water rushing in to the centre from the opposite direction. John Sisko (2002) has argued that this is inconsistent with the static reading: since water does not come to rest in its natural place in this counterfactual situation, the role of place must simply be to define direction. 
Sisko is certainly right to say that there is a problem here. But it is unclear that the dynamic interpretation does any better with the passage he invokes. Mary Louise Gill’s interpretation (this volume) is that the role of natural place is to define the direction of motion, and not to provide a resting spot. Sisko seems to miss what this implies for Aristotle’s conception of direction: “up” and “down” are not defined in “absolute space”; instead, they are defined relative to a place. And this implies that, in the passage we are discussing, water would be moving in a contra-natural direction after it has passed its natural place. It continues to move in the same straight line, but it doesn’t move in the same cosmological direction. So it isn’t clear how a separate natural place for water works even on this attenuated role for natural place. 
I think it likely that Aristotle stumbled in De caelo 4.5.​[8]​ But it is also possible that his treatment of heaviness and lightness in Book 4 is not strictly commensurable with the treatment in Book 1. I suggested a few paragraphs ago that earth is distinguished from water for reasons other than to explain motion. This dovetails in spirit (if not in detail) with the main suggestion that Robert Bolton makes in his contribution to this volume. Bolton argues that Aristotle’s investigation of cosmological properties is a priori because of the relative inaccessibility of the phenomena, while his investigation of perceptually accessible phenomena is more empirical. It is worth noting that the dry-wet, hot-cold pairing is in terms of the “principles of perceptible body” (De gen. et corr. 2.2, 329a7). 
Aristotle seems to have different ways of characterizing the elements in Bolton’s two methodological domains. In Book 4, he adds to the austere doctrine of elements found in De caelo Book 1, which is concerned with nothing other than the three-dimensionality and finiteness of body, and the character of movement and change. The doctrine of elements presented in Books 3 and 4 of De caelo and elsewhere adds new premises and additional principles. These additional principles bring new distinctions, and carry less certainty (cf. Bolton, this volume). They should not be read back into the doctrine of Book 1. 
It is possible, then, that when Aristotle talks about natural place in Book 4, he means something different than what he means in Book 1. My claim is that in Book 1, natural place is a resting place towards which an element moves when displaced from it, provided that it is not impeded. It is possible that in Book 4, he doesn’t have natural motion in mind at all. Possibly, all that he means here is that given the weaker impetus of water towards the centre, it will naturally occupy the region above that occupied by earth. This place is natural as a consequence of natural motion; it does not define natural motion, either as the static or as the dynamic interpretation demands.  Notice, by the way, that on this reading, natural place is a volume or region in Book 4 (since a non-zero quantity of an element will occupy more than a point), but a point in Book 1, since the centre of the Totality is a point. 
I do not believe that the dynamic interpretation can be sustained: at the very least, it takes some fancy footwork to reconcile it with Aristotle’s notion of e-change and the conception of nature as a cause of both motion and rest. 

The Existence of Place

The way of understanding Aristotle’s theory recommended above does not as yet tell us how place “has a certain power”. What it demonstrates is that earth possesses a tendency to move toward the centre of the Totality. But this is a power that earth has in virtue of its being or essence. In section I, we saw that Aristotle implicitly rejects the two most plausible accounts of how place might figure in the natural tendency of an element to move there. So it is unclear how the centre-seeking tendency of earth translates into a power of place. Nor does the account just presented show why place exists. 
Let’s first address the question of existence. Suppose that a philosopher X is disinclined to allow that:
(1) I am in Toronto
implies 
(2) Toronto exists. 
Perhaps X thinks that only material things exist, and that places are not material; perhaps, she thinks that place-attributions such as (1) merely relate substances one to another. On any such view, X would presumably be equally disinclined to think that:
(3) I have a tendency to return to Toronto whenever I am away (provided that I am unimpeded)
implies (2). Since the mere mention of Toronto in (1) is not sufficient to force X to acknowledge the existence of Toronto, the mere fact that Toronto is mentioned in (3) should not be enough either.  
Aristotle’s argument might be taken to address thinkers like X. The point might be that earth’s natural tendency to move to the centre shows that the centre has power, hence exists; this would differentiate (1), which ascribes no power to place, from (3). Of course, this differentiating strategy would work only if (3) implicitly ascribes power to place. On the face of it, however, (3) seems to ascribe power to me not Toronto. It may be that Toronto is implicated in my tendency to return, but we still haven’t been given convincing reason to believe that this is so. In other words, we still do not know what it would take to get from (3) to an ascription of power to Toronto. And the same holds of the centre of the Totality. So we are missing a part of the puzzle. 
Now, one way of addressing the above argument is to insist that already with respect to (1) the place-sceptic X should back down. For it might appear that in (1), place is predicated of an underlying subject. In the Categories, Aristotle maintains that predicables are among the “things that are,” although they depend for their existence on the individual substances of which they are predicated. It might seem to follow that, as Morison (2002, 80) says, “our practice of saying where something is depends on the existence of proper places.” If this is what Aristotle intended, then his argument from the movement of the elements is not meant to differentiate (3) from (1), by showing that (3) implies that Toronto has the power to move me. He would simply be adducing (3) as yet another context in which we are committed to place in virtue of the ontology that he articulates in the Categories. 
This appeal to the ontology of the Categories is misguided, however. The reason is that in the Categories place (topos) is not predicated of substance; rather, where (pou) is predicated of substance. The predicable in (1) is not Toronto, but in Toronto (cf. the examples of wheres given in Categories 4: in the agora, in the Lyceum). Being in Toronto is what characterizes me and the other denizens of this place—Toronto is not a characteristic of us. Similarly, (3) characterizes me in terms of a whither, not in terms of a place. This is not to say it makes no sense to speak of characterizing substances in terms of places; merely that it is elliptical to do so, and that there is therefore no direct logical route from (3) to the power or existence of place. 
Wheres, whences, and whithers are properties of substances: let’s call them locators. Locators are distinct from places, and so we are back to the original problem. The tendency to move to the centre is a locator predicated potentially of earth—a locator derived from the definition of earth. How can we infer from this locator the existence of place? And how does it implicate a power belonging to the centre? 
Now, the Categories does license a more indirect logical route to the reality of place. As we have seen, Aristotle characterizes the place of a body x as the innermost motionless surface of the thing that contains x. Surfaces, and hence places, fall into the non-substantial category of quantity in the Categories (6, 4b24); they, like other non-substantial items, exist because they reside in substances. So one might say that since places are surfaces, they exist. This has the somewhat surprising consequence, however, that my place does not depend on me. For the surface that is implicated in (1) is not a surface of me, but a surface of “the thing that contains” me. In order to validate the reality of my place, we need to look for the substance that contains me. As Aristotle says, “If there is a body outside a given body, a body which contains it, then it is in place, if there is no such body, it is not” (Phys 5.5, 212a31–32).
What is this unique container? The question is important precisely because of Aristotle’s Categories strategy of subordinating the reality of non-substantial things to that of the substances in which they reside. (1) locates me in Toronto. But understood as a piece of land, Toronto does not contain me. Only my feet touch this piece of land; most of my body is surrounded by air. The geometrical surface that contains me is partly air, and partly earth. Do such heterogeneous surfaces exist in Aristotle’s ontology? Of course, it might be that the airy surface exists, because it is a surface of a body of air—of the atmosphere, perhaps. Equally, the earthy surface exists because it is a surface of a body of earth—of the Earth, perhaps, or of Toronto, whatever exists in Aristotle’s ontology. But does the mereological sum of these surfaces exist in Aristotle’s ontology? It would if we could call on a single body that contains me, which partly consists of air, partly of earth. But it is dubious that Aristotle would allow us simply to count just any such assemblage as a full-fledged substance; in general, he does not allow that the sum of two individuals is an individual. So it is not as yet clear how the ontological strategy of the Categories could be sufficient for recognizing the reality of place. 
Benjamin Morison (2002, chapter 5) has dealt with the question of the container in a convincing way. In addition to the above problem with Aristotle’s theory of place, which is a problem about the existence of a container, Morison finds another, which has to do with its uniqueness. It seems axiomatic that:
(4) If y contains x, and z contains y, then z contains x.
For example, if the sphere of the Moon (y) contains the Earth (x), and the Totality (z) contains the sphere of the Moon, then the Totality contains the Earth. Thus, while there may sometimes be a smaller individual thing that contains a given substance, this smaller thing cannot be the thing that contains the substance, since there is always a bigger container, namely, the Totality. 
Now, the Totality is a substance (De caelo 1.9, 278a10–15, b3–4; 3.1, 298a26–31; Metaph. 7.2, 1028b9–13; note that the Totality survives the pruning of the list of substances at the start of 7.16). And it is, as Morison calls it, the “maximal surrounder” (2002, 138). Indeed, the Totality is the maximal surrounder for everything; for as Aristotle himself says, the “common place of all things” is carved out from the Totality, since everything is in it (Phys. 4.2, 209a32–33). We can solve the foregoing difficulties if we simply took the Totality to be the container that Aristotle’s definition of place demands. The surface that contains me is a surface of the Totality, and derives its existence from it. By being located somewhere, I create a “hole” in the Totality. Or to put in another way, by virtue of my location in it, the Totality acquires an interior surface. I reside in this hole; I am bounded by this surface; this is my place. The inner surface created in the Totality by me is, in the ontology articulated in the Categories, one of the things that are. This is why (1) implies the reality of place. 
Taken in this way, the reality of place is not inferred directly from our use of locator predicates. First, we have to factor in what place is, and how it determines the application of locators. In Physics 4, place is found to be a surface. We know from the Categories that surfaces, being non-substantial entities, derive their reality from substances. So we have to identify the substance in which place exists. With Morison’s help, we identify it as the Totality. Only now can we conclude that places exist. 
Note the surprising consequences of this indirect route to the reality of place. First, it turns out to belong to the category of quantity not to the category of where. Secondly, the place of x is not in x, and does not depend on x for its reality. Though it is created, in a straightforward sense, by x, the surface that contains x belongs to x’s container. Finally, the place of x depends for its reality on the substance that contains x. We have seen that this substance is the Totality. Thus, the reality of place depends on the reality of the Totality. 

The Problem of Power

The indirect logical route to the existence of place finds immediate resonance in the De caelo. 
Every body in the form of a part is complete by definition, since it has all the dimensions. But each is made determinate by contact with what is close to it, and hence in a way each of these bodies is many. But the Totality of which these things are parts is necessarily complete, and in every way as the name indicates, and not complete in one way but not in another. (1.1, 268b5–10)
In the first two sentences of this passage, Aristotle is talking about bodies that are contained within the Totality. In the context (268a6–7), we know that bodies are merely entities extended in three dimensions; they have no other individuating property, at least not qua body. (Though it is a three-dimensional entity, an animal is not individuated by its surroundings, as we shall see in a moment, but by its form. The body of an animal, however, considered in abstraction from the animal itself, i.e., merely as an agglomeration of material, is individuated by its surroundings.) Bodies, then, are “made determinate by contact with what is close” to them. In other words, these “partial bodies” are delimited by their place, or the inner surface of the Totality that surrounds them. 
Notice the contrast between two kinds of entity in the last sentence quoted above. Partial bodies are complete “in one way but not in another”, while the Totality is necessarily complete in every way. The Totality is an independent existent; places and partial bodies derive their reality from it. Aristotle is alluding here to his belief that bodies have no intrinsic unity. “What in the world will make mathematical magnitudes one?” he asks at Metaphysics 13.2, 1077a20–23. “For things in our sensible world are one in virtue of soul, or part of soul, or of something else, reasonably enough; when these are not present, the thing is a plurality, and splits up into parts.” The thought he is expressing here is that a body individuated by its spatial extent has no strong individuating conditions. Suppose you added a gram of oil to ten of water, with the oil floating on top. Do you have one body here or two? The problem is that there is no interesting way to answer this question. These things are individuated merely by place, and here there are two ways to define places. The place of the water is different from the place of the oil, and so we have two bodies. Look at this another way: the oil-water mixture has a single place, and so it is one body. Thus, the oil is complete in one way, incomplete in another; consequently, the entire liquid is one in a way, many in another way. 
Organisms are different in this respect: they are one in virtue of functioning as a unit—mass added to an organism’s body will not count as a part of it unless it is capable of participating in the unitary functioning of that body. (There is a difference between a piece of meat I hold in my hand, which is clearly not a part of me, and a digested piece of meat, which provides material that becomes a part of me.) This is what Aristotle is pointing to when he says that living things are “one in virtue of soul”. A partial body cannot be considered one in the fullest sense, because “it is a plurality, and splits up into parts”. And at the beginning of Metaphysics 7.16, Aristotle eliminates partial bodies, “heaps” as he calls them there, from his Metaphysics 7.2 list of substances, on precisely the grounds that these are neither one nor have sources of self-motion qua being one. In this passage, he implicitly leaves the Totality and living organisms as the only genuine substances.
Consider now a weak unity like a clod of earth. It is one only because of its spatial continuity within certain boundaries; in other words, it is made one only “by contact with what is close to it.” Its existence and unity depends on something else, its container; for to repeat our earlier conclusion, its place resides in something else. Its unity is not traced to something intrinsic, such as soul; the clod of earth has no soul. (Another reason for denying that clods of earth have soul is that they are totally homogeneous – homeomerous, in Aristotle’s terminology – and cannot be divided into soul as agent and body as thing-acted-upon: Phy 8.4, 255a15–16). 
The clod has a tendency to move toward the center of the Totality – that is, it moves to the center if not impeded.  Now, we cannot say that the centre of the Totality is a final cause for the clod of earth, a place to which it is attracted because that place constitutes its own perfection. Only things with soul are attracted to a place or to a condition because this place of this condition is good, or good-for-them. For it is only for things that have soul that there is a good.  But as we have seen, weakly unified things like clods of earth lack soul; nothing is a final cause for them.​[9]​  Nor can we say that the centre of the Totality is an efficient cause of the clod’s movement; earth moves toward the centre because of what it is itself.  Having solved the problem of the existence of place, we are back to our original puzzle concerning its power, though with deeper understanding of the difficulties that lie in the way of a solution. How does earth’s tendency to move to the centre translate into a power of place? 

The Stability of a Mass of Earth at the Centre

Machamer’s own solution to these problems is flawed from the outset, though suggestive and insightful. He points to a rather opaque passage in the Physics, which reads as follows:
That each thing is borne to its own place is in accordance with reason. For that which is continuous and touching without force belong to the same kind. And things that are naturally together are impassive, while things that touch one another affect one another. And, not unreasonably, everything stays in its own place. For also a part remains in its place, but what is in a place is a divisible part in relation to the whole, for example, when one moves a certain part of water or air. (4.4, 212b29–213a1)
Aristotle speaks here of the “parts” of an element, bits of the elementary mass residing in a place, for example a clod that is a part of the Earth, i.e., not displaced from it. The claim is that since the bits of earth that constitute the globe stay together without force, and without mutual interaction—they must belong together, and stay together impassively. Machamer draws from this the idea that “the power that natural place has is the power to make a natural or organic unity among those things that are alike by nature” (1978, 379), adding one page later that: “It is not that natural place is a form, but rather that an element attains its proper form when it is in a natural or organic unity with its like.” Let’s call this proposal the Organic Unity Schema. 
The Organic Unity Schema underestimates the role of place. Machamer seems to suggest that a bit of earth is impassively at rest simply because it is together with other bits of earth, the role of place being simply that clods of earth come together there. Aristotle is quite explicit about natural place having a role:
The old saying that “like moves to like” is not true in all circumstances. It would not be the case, if one were to remove the Earth to where the Moon is now, that individual parts would move toward it: instead they would move to where the Earth is now. (De caelo 4.3, 310b1–5)
The Earth does not stick together just because it is a great homogeneous mass of stuff. Removed from its natural place, the “natural or organic unity of earth” will break down as all the little clods race to the bottom. It is only when it is in its natural place, that Earth is a natural unity. Place is part of the explanation why all the bits of earth that constitute Earth stay together; mere consanguinity cannot do the trick by itself. 
This said, it must be acknowledged that Machamer’s Organic Unity Schema touches on an important principle. To see why, let us examine another plausible (but, according to Aristotle, wrongheaded) explanation of why Earth is a continuous mass. 
Materialist Schema Consider a clod of earth on the surface of the globe. It has a tendency to move toward the centre. Why then is it not at the centre? Because it is prevented from getting there by all the earth between it and the centre. If it were separated from the surface of the globe by air, it would set off toward the centre, and come to rest when it contacted the surface of the Earth. Similarly if it were on the surface of the ocean it would sink. It can get below any other element, but not below other bits of earth. This capacity of earth to replace other elements below it results in an agglomeration of earth around the centre. 
The passage from Physics 4 quoted right at the beginning of the present section indicates that this Materialist Schema, which attaches no importance to properties of the whole globe, shifting the explanatory burden to the stuff out of which the Earth is made, is mistaken. The Materialist Schema suggests that only the one clod of earth at the exact centre of the Totality manages to realize its form. All the other bits of earth are prevented from getting there. This is at odds with Aristotle’s claim that the mass of earth is impassive when it is at the centre; its rest is not maintained by the mutual interactions of bits of earth.​[10]​ 
So his claim must be understood in this way: 
Aristotelian Schema When it is at the centre (but not otherwise) the Earth constitutes a stable and impassive unity. 
Parts of the contiguous mass of Earth that are not at the centre should not therefore be regarded as impeded; they are not prevented from realizing their form; on the contrary, they do actualize their form. The Aristotelian Schema adds the power of place to Machamer’s Organic Unity Schema; it adumbrates—far from transparently—how place is invoked. 
The Materialist Schema is attractive to us, but not to Aristotle. It is attractive to us—modern materialists that we are—because it undermines the explanatory value of wholes. Certain large entities—populations, ecosystems, states—look as if they are designed as a whole: one is inclined to think that in order to explain certain stable properties of these large entities, there is no choice but to appeal to autonomous laws with specific application to entities of this kind. For instance, the stability of ecosystems leads some ecologists to posit laws that apply to these systems autonomously, i.e., with no reference to the organisms and environmental features that constitute it. 
A common materialist strategy in opposition to such particularism is what Robert Nozick (1974, 18–22) calls the “invisible hand”. (He takes the term from Adam Smith.) An invisible hand strategy attempts to show how the nature of the parts is quite sufficient to explain stable properties of the whole; for instance, it might be that these parts tend of their own accord to find themselves in certain equilibrium states regardless of where they start from—these equilibrium states turn out simply to constitute the large entities and stable properties that were the object of investigation at the outset. Nozick explains the strategy in the following terms:
Fundamental explanations of a realm are explanations of the realm in other terms; they make no use of any of the notions of the realm. Only via such explanations can we explain and hence understand everything about a realm; the less our explanations use notions constituting what is to be explained, the more (ceteris paribus) we understand (ibid., 19). 
The stability of the Earth at the centre of the Totality tempts one to think that it is meant to be there. The Materialist Schema purports to show, from authentically Aristotelian principles concerning the nature of the elements, that from any random starting point, earth will tend to congregate at the centre of the Totality. It thus eschews the explanation of the Earth’s position in holistic terms. It is, in essence, an invisible hand explanation. 
Aristotle emphatically rejects the strategy of the invisible hand in cases where the large-scale phenomenon to be explained is stable, a fortiori when this phenomenon is eternal. In De caelo 2.1, for example, he rejects the notion that the motion of the heavens can be achieved by an external mover: eternal motion cannot involve constraint or effort. (He makes a related point in Motion of Animals 4: earth does not move to the centre by constraint. See also Phys 2.4 196a25-b4.) Motion of this type requires effort and is contingent upon the will of an external mover; eternal motion cannot be contingent since it is impossible that something that could cease has never and will never cease (1.12, 283a25). States of affairs of this type cannot be “by coincidence or spontaneous”; hence, they are “for the sake of something,” i.e., because they are good (Phys. 2.8, 199a4–5). 
If nothing that happens by chance or spontaneity could be eternal, and the heaven and its circular motion are eternal, by what cause is this motion in one direction rather than the other? Necessarily, either this is a principle or there is a principle for it. (De caelo 2.5, 287b25–27)
Eternal things cannot be by chance. The invisible hand makes the large-scale phenomenon a matter of coincidence or spontaneity, Aristotle believes. (Here he is in bad company: think of modern creationists and their arguments against Darwinian explanations.)




One might think that the Aristotelian Schema renders the strategies of the Materialist Schema not just incomplete but superfluous, at least for the explanation of the position of the Earth. True, we may need to invoke the element-potentials of earth, its downward-moving and centre-resting tendencies, in order to explain why a clod of earth held high falls when it is released. But this does not apply to the cosmic order. Once a domain-specific higher-level principle has been invoked to explain facts such as that the Earth is at the centre, that the stars are above, and so on, don’t the element-potentials cease to play any further role in explaining these facts? 
The line of thought just set out misses a central procedural tenet of Aristotle’s holisitic explanatory strategies. Whenever Aristotle posits a matter-form analysis of an entity, he also posits a nexus of material causes that will achieve and maintain the form (cf. Matthen 1989, Meyer 1991). When an architect designs a wall, he desires to build a strong and stable structure. So he puts the heavy materials below, where they will support the mass of building above, and the lighter elements above where they will put the least burden on the foundations below. Thus, the explanation of the structure wall in terms of element-potentials, the heavy below and the light above, is not entirely misplaced: if you put the stone on top, it would come crashing downward through the lighter wood. As far as the cosmos goes, his point is not that its order is explainable without reference to element-potentials, but that any such explanation has to be subordinated to principles like the Aristotelian Schema above. 
This is illustrated by his treatment of the rain cycle. He gives a teleological account of this process in Generation and Corruption 2.10: it is “the closest approximation to eternal being,” he says there. But having understood it in this way, he gives an account of the cycle in terms of heating, cooling, rising, falling etc. both in the text just mentioned and in Meteorology I. These actions cannot be understood in abstraction from their role in the cosmos, however: they merely manifest the independent principles of how the cosmos is arranged and ordered (cf. the criticism of the Timaeus at De caelo 3.2, 300b17–26).
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^1	  Seemingly he agrees: see De caelo 3.7, 306a20–22, and Robert Bolton (2009), section II.
^2	  This is, of course, false on the definition of motion just sketched from the differential calculus, since each particle of a rotating body changes direction at all times, from which it follows that its state of motion is in constant change. 
^3	  The expression ‘e-change’ coincides roughly with a technical use of kinesis in Aristotle (Phys. 3.1), which he contrasts with energeia in Metaphysics 9.6. But he does not always use kinesis in this way; sometimes, he uses it in the way we use ‘movement’. 
^4	  De caelo 2.3, 286a20–21
^5	  Gill (2009, n. 10) takes a different view: that the actuality is “dynamic”. “[A] thing is most actual when it is acting according to its nature. What needs to be explained is why things stop moving, not why they start,” she says. It should be noted that the dynamic interpretation cannot be extended to the natures of living things. A human being is most actual when mature, not when it is developing. There is no need to explain why a child stops growing once it has attained maturity. It stops because it has attained its form.
^6	  Cohen (1994) thinks that in order to accommodate Aristotle’s thought that the elements are not self-movers, one must identify nature and essence.  I am sceptical. 
^7	  This shows, by the way, that the place of rest does not wholly account for the motion of the elements – the difference between the motion of earth and that of water cannot be derived from their natural place.  (See Bodnar 1997 on the need for a mixed interpretation: however, I argue below that Book IV is not on the same track as Book I.)  
^8	  He certainly seems to stumble when he suggests that heaviness and lightness are not symmetric (312b3–10). Because air is only relatively light, it is also heavy to some extent. Thus, air will descend to the place of water if the latter is removed. This raises the question: shouldn’t air have in it more of lightness than heaviness? Why then would it descend, even if there is nothing to support it? The answer seems to be that the relative lightness of air does not have the corresponding effect: “air will not move upwards to the place of fire if the fire is removed, except by force”. Here, Aristotle seems to allude to the action of a pipette: when water is released from it, air naturally replaces it from above, but force is required to draw water upward into it. The problem is that there is nothing in his cosmological principles to support this asymmetry. Thus, the principle seems of asymmetry to be introduced speculatively and ad hoc to explain an empirical observation. On this point, Bolton’s (this volume) “two standards of inquiry”—actually two methodologies—clash. 
^9	  Not all commentators accept this constraint on final causation, it should be said.  Richard Sorabji (1988, 187), for example, claims that natural place is a final cause for elementary motion but does not explain how being at the center is good for a clod of earth. Keimpe Algra (1995, 208) too thinks that the natural motion of the elements is “obviously teleological.” He acknowledges (1995, 218n) that Aristotelian final causes are for the sake of a good, but pleads that being at the center might be good relative to some [other?] substance. It seems to me that while it may well be better for the Totality that some earth should be at the center, it cannot be better even from this point of view that any particular clod should be so. How then does the center constitute a cause of this clod’s movement?
^10	  I am inclined to think that the Materialist Schema is similar to Mary Louise Gill’s claim that pieces of earth stay still because they are vying with other pieces of earth for the centre. 
